PROMOTING FARM SAFETY WITH ECONOMIC AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES by Park, Timothy A. & Hartley, Judy
 Promoting Farm Safety with Economic and Managerial Incentives 
TIMOTHY A. PARK
*




Georgia Healthy Farmers Project 
Environmental Health
Hinesville, GA 31313-2701
*Contact author.  313A Conner Hall, Univ. of Georgia, Athens, GA. 30602-7509.  (T): 706-542-
0731, (F): 706-542-0739, E-mail: TPark@agecon.uga.edu
Promoting Farm Safety with Economic and Managerial Incentives ABSTRACT
The ex ante marginal values of management strategies for farm producers facing significant exposures
to accident risks is assessed.  A probit model describing the factors influencing the probability of a
farm accident is estimated jointly with an ordered probit model for the severity of the accident.1
Promoting Farm Safety with Economic and Managerial Incentives 
The National Safety Council reports that farming and mining has consistently ranked
among the nation's most hazardous occupations.  Yet even as death rates in mining have
decreased, comparative fatality and accident rates in agriculture remain high.  Thu et al. (1997)
noted that risk factors for agricultural injuries appear to differ significantly from those for other
occupations and present a challenge for modelling and designing effective health and safety
programs. 
The objective of this paper is to apply valuation methods based on the expected utility
model to assess the ex ante marginal value of management strategies for farm producers facing
significant exposures to accident risks.  The model exploits survey data on producer
characteristics, farm organization, and work routines along with accident outcomes to estimate
and evaluate factors that jointly influence the occurrence of accidents and the severity of observed
accidents.
Individual responses to dealing with risk may involve interventions to reduce the
probability of an accident or management decisions to limit the severity of an accident that occur. 
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) recognized that risk can be reduced by two main types of private or
collection actions.  Self-protection refers to managerial strategies or actions that reduce the
probability of an event given the magnitudes of the prospective loss.  Self-insurance is designed to
reduce the size of the possible loss if an accident occurs, given the probability distribution of the
hazardous event.  Self-protection and self-insurance respond in different ways to risk attitudes and
have different implications for the demand for preventive care and insurance. 2
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Kisner and Pratt (1997) also distinguished between the probability and severity of injuries. 
They used data from the National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities surveillance system to show
that older workers are more likely to experience injuries that result in death or permanent
disability than are younger workers.  Root (1981) suggested that although older workers
experience fewer work-related injuries, the injuries that do occur are more severe. 
Effective health and safety programs to reduce the adverse impact of farm injuries must
address the issue of how to allocate resources to reduce the impact of accidents.  One policy
option is to target resources to reduce the probability that an accident occurs.  A second approach
focusses on allocating resources to reduce the severity of the accidents that do occur.
Specification of the Choice Model
The risk-averse producer’s utility function is defined over goods X and an adverse work
related event such as an accident A over which the producer has no direct control.  The variable A
measures the severity of the accident and takes the value A
* with probability p and the value 0
with the probability 1 - p. 
The preference ordering for this state is represented by the indirect utility function denoted
by V(M, P, A) where M and P represent income and prices which are assumed constant. 
Accidents have an adverse impact on the producer’s utility so that the producer’s utility is lower
when the accident A
* occurs so that V(M, P, 0) > V(M, P, A
*). 
Following Freeman (1991) producers maximize expected utility so that observed behavior
is the solution to the following maximization problem:3











































Consider managerial strategies and occupational health and safety policies that attempt to
influence the probability of a farm accident.  The ex ante marginal value for a change in the
probability of an accident is derived from: 
The ex ante marginal value for a change in the probability of an accident can be written as an
elasticity
Producers also are concerned with the severity of accidents and welfare measures to limit this
source of risk can be derived.  The ex ante willingness to pay for a marginal change for reduced 
severity of an accident is presented in elasticity form as 
A key risk management issue is whether producers are more responsive to changes in the
probability of accident or to changes in the severity of an accident.  Examining the income
elasticity terms defined in equations (3) and (4), we see that 0Mp > 0Ma if4
If the producer is risk-averse or VMM < 0, this condition cannot hold.  The term V
na - V
a
represents the chord connecting two points on the producer’s expected utility indifference curve. 
The producer’s utility when no accident occurs is V
na.  When the producer is injured in an
accident, utility is V
a.
The term VM
a represents the marginal utility of income when an accident occurs and is the
slope of the indifference curve.  When the utility function is concave or producers are risk-averse
the tangent represented by VM must be steeper than the chord represented by V
na - V
a.  Robison
and Barry (1987) demonstrate this effect graphically and survey the methods available to risk-
averse competitive agricultural producers for managing uncertainty.  The risk-averse producer is
more sensitive to changes in the severity of an accident than to changes in the probability of an
accident.
A second implication compares the elasticity of the willingness to pay measure for risk-
averse producers with the  welfare measure for risk-neutral producers.  Risk-averse producers
prefer policies that reduce the severity of an accident while risk-neutral farmers place equal value
on policies that enhance self-protection and self-insurance. 
Modelling the Probability of a Farm Accident
The economic model highlights the importance of identifying critical factors that influence
both the probability and severity of farm accidents.  Risk-averse producers place higher value on
information that assists them in reducing the severity of farm accidents.  A probit model
describing the factors influencing the probability of a farm accident is estimated jointly with an
ordered probit model for the severity of the accident.5
The Georgia Healthy Farmers Project (GHFP) is designed to address the high injury rates
in farming using information and expertise provide by occupational health nurses.  The GHFP,
funded by the National Institute for Occupation Safety and Health, covers six south Georgia
farming counties and is one of ten state-based Occupational Health Nurses in Agricultural
Communities (OHNAC) Projects (Hartley, 1994). 
Model Specification and Analysis 
Using information from the GHFP a farm accident (FA) is identified when as incidents that
occurred when the victim was directly engaged in farm work.  The FA variable is positive when
the accident is incurred in farming activities and is zero to record an accident that was unrelated
to farm work activity.  The probability that a farm accident occurred is specified as a linear
function of demographic variables and information on producer organizational and work habit
variables.
The farm injury surveillance report gathered information on the severity of the farm
accident.  The severity of the accident was identified by a certified health professional, an
emergency medical service attendant, or a police officer.  Information on accident severity was
collected after identifying detailed information on the type of injury, contributing to the accuracy
of the severity measure.
The explanatory variables and distribution of the accident severity measure are shown in
Table 1 for accidents identified as farm-related work accidents (229 incidents) and for accidents
that were not work related (91 incidents). 
The severity of the farm accident is a measured as a discrete ordered continuous variable. 
The ordered probit model defined in Greene (1993) is used to analyze the factors influencing
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where SEV
* is the true but unobserved injury severity, X represents the explanatory variables, and
gi is the person-specific error term.  The parameter $ is a vector of coefficients that measure the
average impact of the explanatory variables on the level of injury severity.  The true level of injury
severity is not observed but is measured by the categories defined by the accident information
survey.  The observed variable SEV represents the classes of injuries but not the actual level of
harm associated with the injury.  Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the ordered
probit model obtained using LIMDEP (Greene, 1993) are asymptotically efficient and
asymptotically normal.
The Probability and Severity of Farm Accidents
Maximum likelihood estimates for the probit model of farm accidents are presented in
Table 2.  The impacts of key explanatory variables on the probability that a farm accident
occurred are presented in Table 2 along with standard errors for these measures.  Marginal effects
for dichotomous explanatory variables are calculated as the difference between the accident
probability when the condition occurs and when the condition does not occur. 
Estrella’s R
2 measure for models based on dichotomous dependent variables evaluates the
fit of the estimated probit model.  The probit model incorrectly predicted accidents for 19 percent
of the cases.  These incorrect predictions were allocated between incorrect predictions of an
accident that did not occur (6 percent) and incorrect predictions of no accident when one did take
place (13 percent). 
   Table 3 reports the coefficients, standard errors, and marginal effects from the ordered
probit model for accident severity.  The goodness of fit measure proposed by Veall and7
Zimmermann (1992) assesses the fit of the model.  The marginal effects measure the impact of a
change in the explanatory variable on the probability of accident severity across each of the three
levels.
The probit model identifies five factors that have a significant impacts on the probability
that a farm accident occurred.  Significant variables that influence the severity of accidents are
more difficult to identify from the ordered probit model as the ordered probit model reveals only
three statistically significant variables.  Only two variables are significant in both the probability of
accident and severity of accident model. 
The probit model indicates that older farmers and hired farmworkers are more likely to be
involved in farm accidents.  Workers who live alone have a lower probability of an accident,
indicating that farmers may take extra care or alter work habits when immediate assistance will be
unavailable.  The severity of accident is not impacted by the fact that a farmer lives alone. 
Farmers who arrange work schedules so that other adult workers are present also have a lower
probability of farm accident but this factor plays no role in the severity of accidents.  The value of
heightened self-protection is highlighted by the medical conditions variable which records whether
previously existing medical conditions contributed to the injury.  This measure has a negative
coefficient on the probability of a farm accident.  
The location of the accident was identified as a private area if the work activity was
located near the home, work structure, or private farm property.  Reis and Elkind (1997)
suggested that habitual and routine farm operations may contribute to a higher probability of
accidents.  Familiar work locations and routine tasks that are frequently are organized to take
place in the private areas identified in this variable may contribute to lower levels of safety8
practice.  Results from the probit and ordered probit model show that both the probability of an
accident and the severity of accident were significantly effected by the area of work location.
The overall results confirm that information valued by risk-averse producers to assist in
reducing the probability of farm accidents can be extracted from surveys such as the Georgia
Healthy Farmers Project.  The goodness of fit measures suggest that models designed to identify
observable factors that lower the probability of farm accidents outperform those models aimed at
reducing the severity of accidents.  The marginal effects from the probit model demonstrate that
changes in an explanatory variable has a greater impact on the probability of a farm accident than
on the severity of observed accidents. 
The policy implications from defining a set of observable factors that influence farm safety
should be addressed.  Von Essen et al. (1997) highlight the need for incentives to convince
farmers to take advantage of new technology and work strategies to reduce work hazards and
health risks.  They suggest linking health insurance products and pricing strategies to farm
inspection and safety promotion practices.  Identifying observable factors that are related to farm
safety may guide in the development of incentives to reward and sustain safe farming practices. 9
Table 1. Variable Description and Summary Statistics
a
    Entire  Reported 
Variable Description     Sample Accident 
SEV  Severity of farm-related accident 
Mild injury  46.9 45.4
Moderate injury  40.9 44.5
Severe injury  8.8 8.3
Fatal injury 3.4 1.8
LIVEALONE Injured party lives alone  48.8 11.1
AGE  Age of injured party  33.6 37.2
FLTMFRMR Accident occurred to fulltime  23.4 27.1
  farmer
HDFRMWKR Accident occurred to hired  26.9 32.8
  farmworker
ALONEAGE  LIVALONE * AGE  11.23 10.8
PRIVAREA  Accident occurred in private area 61.9 68.1
  on the farm 
MEDCOND Medical condition contributed to  4.7 4.8
  injury
FRMMACH Accident involved farm machinery  44.4 48.5
ADLTWKR Accident occurred while working  33.1 27.1
with an adult worker 
SELFPAY Self payment  47.5 42.8
N Sample size 320 229
a  Percentage of respondents for AGE shown in years.10
 Table 2.Estimates for Probability and Severity of Farm Accidents 





































aAsymptotic t-values in parentheses with significance at 0.05 level.11
Table 3.Likelihood of accident severity: Ordered probit analysis
Marginal effect on probability
Variable Coefficient Mild  Moderate Severe Fatal
LIVEALONE 0.043
(0.078)
-0.017 0.012 0.005 0.0009
AGE 0.013*
(1.969)
-0.005 0.003 0.001 0.0003
FLTMFRMR 0.054
(0.265)
-0.021 0.014 0.006 0.001
HDFRMWKR 0.252
(0.942)
-0.100 0.068 0.027 0.005
PRIVAREA 0.394*
(2.041)
-0.157 0.106 0.043 0.008
ALONEAGE -0.007
(0.459)
0.003 -0.002 -0.0008 -0.0001
MEDCOND 0.195
(0.405)
-0.078 0.052 0.021 0.004
ADLTWKR 0.334
(1.267)
-0.133 0.089 0.036 0.007
FRMMACH 0.416*
(2.355)
-0.166 0.112 0.045 0.009
SELFPAY 0.178
(1.094)





MU (2)  2.356*
(6.752)
R-squared 0.13
aAsymptotic t-values in parentheses with significance at 0.05 level.12
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